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Abstract
Aims: To explore the potential impact of a minimum unit price (MUP: 50 pence per UK unit) on the
alcohol consumption of ill Scottish heavy drinkers.
Methods: Participants were 639 patients attending alcohol treatment services or admitted to hos-
pital with an alcohol-related condition. From their reported expenditure on alcohol in their index
week, and assuming this remained unchanged, we estimated the impact of a MUP (50 ppu) on
future consumption. (Around 15% purchased from both the more expensive on-sale outlets
(hotels, pubs, bars) and from off-sales (shops and supermarkets). For them we estimated the
change in consumption that might follow MUP if (i) they continued this proportion of ‘on-sales’
purchasing or (ii) their reported expenditure was moved entirely to off-sale purchasing (to main-
tain consumption levels)).
Results: Around 69% of drinkers purchased exclusively off-sale alcohol at <50ppu. Their drinking,
post MUP, may reduce by a mean of 33%. For this group, from a population of very heavy, ill consu-
mers, we were unable to show a differential effect across multiple deprivation quintiles. For other drin-
kers there might be no reduction, especially if after MUP there were many products priced close to
50 ppu. Moving away from on-sales purchases could support, for some, an increase in consumption.
Conclusions: While a proportion of our harmed, heavy drinkers might be able to mitigate the
impact of MUP by changing purchasing habits, the majority are predicted to reduce purchasing.
This analysis, focusing speciﬁcally on harmed drinkers, adds a unique dimension to the evidence
base informing current pricing policy.
Short Summary: From drink purchasing data of heavy drinkers, we estimated the impact of legis-
lating £0.50 minimum unit price. Over two thirds of drinkers, representing all multiple deprivation
quintiles, were predicted to decrease alcohol purchasing; remainder, hypothetically, could main-
tain consumption. Our data address an important gap within the evidence base informing policy.
INTRODUCTION
The detrimental impact of alcohol misuse on Scottish health and
society has received considerable attention within the media and the
research literature. In 2015 there were over 1150 alcohol-related
deaths (around 22 per week) (National Records for Scotland, 2015).
Associated economic costs were estimated to be around £7.5 billion
per annum in a recent cost of illness study which considered costs
linked to healthcare, social care, crime and lost productivity, etc.
(Johnston et al., 2012), that is approximately £1660 for every
Scottish adult aged 16 years or over. One response from the Scottish
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Government has been the passing of the Alcohol (Minimum Pricing)
(Scotland) Act 2012 (Scottish Parliament, 2012), which recommends
the setting of a minimum unit price (MUP) for alcohol (one UK unit
equals 8 gm/10ml ethanol), presently favoured at 50 pence (£0.5:
US$0.64) per UK unit (50 ppu). However, the date of implementa-
tion remains uncertain due to legal challenges. Amongst those advo-
cating the beneﬁts of MUP, there is acceptance that it cannot be
promoted as a single solution, rather it will contribute in an array of
initiatives to target alcohol misuse in Scotland (Alcohol Health
Alliance, 2016; Scottish Government, 2016).
Scotland is not unique in advocating a minimum pricing policy
to address alcohol misuse and an international body of research has
emerged over recent years providing persuasive evidence of conse-
quent public health beneﬁts (Purshouse et al., 2010; Ludbrook et al.,
2012; Stockwell et al., 2012a, 2013; Brennan et al., 2014; Cousins
et al., 2016; Meier et al., 2016). The potential societal beneﬁts of
MUP for Scotland were estimated in modelling by Shefﬁeld
University (Meng et al., 2012; Angus et al., 2016) utilizing data
provided by health surveys, household spending surveys, population-
level sales data, meta-analyses of epidemiological data and administra-
tive health and health economic data.
A 50 ppu MUP was associated with a potential fall in overall
consumption of 3.5% with the concomitant harm reduction over
the initial 20-year period being estimated at 2036 fewer deaths and
38,859 fewer hospitalizations. Harmful drinkers were predicted to
experience the greatest reduction in consumption (around 246 UK
units per annum). Ludbrook et al. (2012) have recognized the
importance of considering the impact of socioeconomic status on
individual responsiveness to MUP and indeed Angus et al. (2016)
proposed that amongst those drinking the most (i.e. harmful drin-
kers) 15.3% fewer deaths per annum would occur for those in pov-
erty, but only 4.4% fewer if not in poverty (Poverty being deﬁned as
an individual having an equivalized household income below 60%
of the population median).
In Scotland, survey data suggest that the heaviest 10% of drin-
kers are responsible for 46% of alcohol consumed (Beeston et al.,
2016). These drinkers are, by implication, those who suffer the
greatest alcohol-induced harm and the most likely to be signiﬁcantly
impacted by MUP. Appreciation of their likely response to MUP is a
key piece of evidence in the public health debate around the utility
of MUP. In their modelling work highlighting the potential beneﬁts
of MUP on consumption levels and harm indices, Angus et al.
(2016) employed a deﬁnition of harmful drinkers as exceeding 50
UK units for men and 35 units for women per week. Previous
research with heavy, harmed drinkers seen at NHS settings in the
UK (Black et al., 2011, 2014; Sheron et al., 2014) where mean con-
sumption was 198, 215 and 145 UK units per week, respectively,
has highlighted the extent to which the mean consumption for the
recorded week was well in excess of these deﬁnition thresholds, in
fact as many as 4–6 times. By way of contrast, in the 2013 Scottish
Health Survey (Scottish Government, 2014), for those drinkers
within the ‘harmful’ category (exceeding 35/50 UK units for women/
men, respectively), the mean weekly consumption was 69.4 units.
An additional point of note is that the informing population health
survey data relates to householders. Heavy drinkers are likely
under-represented for they can be hard to contact due to lifestyle
factors or may decline to participate. In this study we aim to address
this gap and inform the debate around the likely impact of MUP on
the heaviest consumers by presenting data relating to the purchasing
habits of drinkers from each of the multiple deprivation quintiles,
harmed as a consequence of consumption and recruited within
healthcare settings. We explore the potential impact of a minimum
unit price (MUP: 50 pence per UK unit) on the alcohol consumption
of our sample of ill Scottish heavy drinkers as a whole and when
stratiﬁed by SIMD (Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation)
quintiles.
METHODS
Data collection and primary analyses are described by Black et al.
(2014) and Gill et al. (2015a, 2015b). In summary, between
December 2011 and October 2012 consecutive outpatients and day
patients whose health had been harmed by alcohol consumption
(based on clinician’s assessment) were recruited from Scottish NHS
clinics, at settings within two major Scottish cities, Edinburgh and
Glasgow. Together these cities comprise approximately one third of
the Scottish population. Following the initial approach by the clin-
ician, site speciﬁc interviewers described the study in detail and
obtained consent. They also administered the questionnaires (Black
et al., 2014).
Exclusion criteria were—being under 18 years old, unable to
understand the questions or give understandable answers in English,
evidence of clinically signiﬁcant memory impairment, e.g. Korsakov’s
Dementia, being unwilling to be contacted for three further follow-
up interviews (this relates to a follow-up study not reported here). In
addition, advice from clinicians at each site was taken where patients
were unsuitable for inclusion due to separate clinical issues.
Approval was obtained from Regional Ethics Committees (REC
reference 08/S1101/9).
Interviewers administered a questionnaire (Black et al., 2014)
which documented the participant’s most recent 7 days of drinking
using the time line follow-back method (Sobell and Sobell, 1996) or
their most typical week. Participants’ self-reported alcohol consump-
tion and expenditure including the type, volume, brand (when known)
of beverage, cost and location of purchase (‘on-sales’: bar, pub, hotel,
restaurant, etc., or ‘off-sales’: supermarket, corner shop, off-licence
shop, etc.). The interviews were not time limited and interviewers
clariﬁed detail where necessary. Manufacturers’ and supermarkets’
websites were checked to conﬁrm prices. Gender and postcode were
documented, the latter acting as a proxy for socioeconomic status
using the Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation (SIMD) (Scottish
Government, 2012a, 2012b). The 2012 SIMD divides Scotland into
6505 small geographical areas called datazones containing approxi-
mately 350 households identiﬁed by postcode. Each datazone is
assigned a rank of relative deprivation based on seven domains
(employment, income, health, education, geographic access to services,
crime and housing). We used our participant’s postcode to record the
SIMD rank by quintile: 1 = most deprived, 5 = least deprived.
Deﬁnitions of drinker groups
We have no knowledge of how retailers would price their alcohol
sales if MUP was introduced. It is conceivable that, to maintain sales
(and continue to attract ‘footfall’ in the shop or supermarket), many
drinks could be priced at or just above the minimum price/unit. We
also recognize, however, that products above the MUP threshold
could also increase in price, i.e. ‘premiumisation’ could occur
whereby producers increase drink prices of higher quality products
to maintain a price differential over low quality products. In this ana-
lysis, to estimate the change in consumption that might occur in our
population of heavy drinkers, we chose a conservative approach and
estimated what could happen to consumption, assuming our
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drinkers’ expenditure remained unchanged and if they could now
purchase alcohol at 50 ppu but no less. Thus, we have assumed an
elasticity of −1.0, i.e. that consumption will reduce in direct propor-
tion to price increase.
Four groups of drinker types have been identiﬁed in our sample.
Group A are drinkers who purchased exclusively from pubs, clubs,
hotels and bars (on-sales). We reasoned that their pattern of drink-
ing would be unchanged—MUP will not affect on-sales’ prices
which are already well over 50 ppu.
For drinkers purchasing exclusively from off-sales, we examined
the effect separately for those who were currently paying on average
at or above MUP, i.e. 50 ppu or more (Group B) and those currently
purchasing on average less than 50 ppu (Group C). In both groups
we assumed their current expenditure per index week would not
change. For Group B, apparently resistant to the proposed level of
MUP (50 ppu), we calculated the percentage of this group who
would however reduce consumption if MUP was instead set at high-
er levels, namely, 60 ppu and 70 ppu. In Group C, all theoretically
currently susceptible to MUP at 50 ppu, we estimated the potential
impact of a 50 ppu price by calculating the reduction in units pur-
chased if expenditure was unchanged, and the consequent change in
consumption. We present this data by multiple deprivation quintile.
For drinkers purchasing from both on- and off-sales outlets (Group
D) we recognize that they may have more ﬂexibility when responding
to MUP. They could lessen its impact by reducing their more expensive
on-sales purchasing and switching all their monies to off-sale purchas-
ing, or alternatively they may choose for reasons of sociability, etc. to
maintain on-sales purchasing, with theoretically only their off-sale pur-
chasing being subject to MUP. We present data for both scenarios. As
above, we have estimated the effects, assuming their overall expend-
iture on alcohol remains as recorded for their index week; we present
the ﬁndings by multiple deprivation quintile.
Data analysis
Data were analysed using SPSS version 21. Descriptives (mean and
standard deviation) for the average (index week consumption (UK
units), price paid and expenditure) are presented by group and
SIMD, multiple deprivation quintile. In Group C (those drinkers pre-
dicted to be susceptible to MUP) the most and least deprived were
compared for predicted consumption change and price paid with the
Mann–Whitney U-test. For Groups B to D, The Jonckheere–Terpstra
test was employed to test for price paid trend across the multiple
deprivation quintiles, one sided. An alpha value of 0.05, two-sided,
was considered signiﬁcant. (Numbers in Group A were too low to
permit further analysis.)
RESULTS
Of the patients identiﬁed as eligible by clinicians, 150 refused to par-
ticipate and, in 20 cases, the researcher had concerns and terminated
the interview. Completed Interviews were obtained for 639 patients
(response rate 79%).
Data relating to the estimated changes in consumption after a
hypothetical MUP of 50 ppu are presented in Table 1.
As already stated, Group A (n = 19) who were deﬁned as those
purchasing exclusively in on-sale outlets are expected to be
unaffected by a MUP of 50 pence, no change in consumption is pre-
dicted post MUP. The average mean price (SD) paid by this group
was 113 (19) pence per unit. Since the lowest mean unit price paid
was 71 pence (for beer), raising the level of MUP by 10 or 20 pence
is unlikely to impact on this group’s consumption. No drinkers
belonged to the least deprived quintile.
Group B are deﬁned as those purchasing exclusively from off-
sales but already paying a mean price of 50 ppu or more (n = 84).
Theoretically this group (13% of all drinkers) would also be
unaffected by MUP set at 50 ppu and no change in consumption is
predicted. (However, for interest, we calculated that if MUP was
raised to 60 ppu and they continued to spend the same sum on alco-
hol, 74% were predicted to reduce consumption, and 95% of drin-
kers would do so at 70 ppu (not shown in Table)). We did detect
evidence of a signiﬁcant trend in price paid across quintiles with ris-
ing average price paid, being linked to decreasing deprivation (TJT =
1471.5, z = 2.18, P = 0.015; 1-tailed).
Group C, which accounted for the majority (68.5%, n = 438) of
our sample, was also deﬁned as purchasing exclusively from off-sale
outlets, but had been paying a mean price of less than 50 ppu. If it is
assumed that their expenditure remains unchanged, all would
decrease consumption, and the predicted mean percentage fall in
consumption varies from 28.0% (deprivation quintile 5, the least
deprived) to 34.8% (deprivation quintile 1). The estimated effect
across multiple deprivation quintiles is shown in Table 1. The
Jonckheere–Terpstra test for trend across multiple deprivation quin-
tiles was not signiﬁcant for unit price (TJT = 34539.5, z = 1.498,
P < 0.07; 1-tailed) or for percentage fall in consumption (TJT =
30410.5, z = −1.408, P < 0.08; 1-tailed). We also compared the
least deprived quintile with the most deprived quintile; they did not
differ signiﬁcantly in terms of average unit price paid (Mann–
Whitney U = 2810.5, z = −1.516, P = 0.129) or percentage change
in consumption (Mann–Whitney U = 2826.5, z = −1.473, P =
0.141). Since Group C, by deﬁnition, are those most likely to be
acutely affected by MUP, we also explored the impact of MUP on
consumption in terms of UK deﬁnitions of ‘harmful drinker’. The
percentage in Group C consuming below the UK threshold of harm-
ful drinking for males (50 UK units/week) was estimated to increase
from 3% to 9.1% following MUP.
In Group D (15.3%, n = 98), deﬁned as those who purchased
from both on-sale and off-sale outlets, a range of possible responses
to MUP can be proposed. At one extreme, drinkers could react by
maintaining their more expensive consumption within on-sale set-
tings with only their off-sale purchasing being affected by MUP. At
the other extreme they could direct all expenditure to subsidize their
purchasing from off-sale outlets post MUP. In the former case 65%
would decrease consumption post MUP, in the latter case 21%
would do so. In both scenarios some drinkers (already paying in
excess of 50 ppu for their off-sale drinks) could in theory increase
consumption post MUP (see Table 1).
The Jonckheere–Terpstra test for trend across multiple depriv-
ation quintiles was not signiﬁcant for unit price (TJT = 1928.0, z =
0.601, P = 0.268; 1-tailed)
If we assign a zero percentage change in consumption to drinkers
in Groups A and B following MUP, and total the predicted changes
in consumption for drinkers in Group C plus one or other of the
two possible scenarios for Group D we calculate an average con-
sumption fall of between 23.8% and 24.8% or 59.7-61.8 UK units
per week for the entire sample of 639 participants.
DISCUSSION
The key contribution made by the present study to the evidence base
currently informing debate is the better description of the potential
response of a relatively under researched treatment sample to policy
3Alcohol and Alcoholism
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Table 1. Impact of MUP at 50 ppu in differing groups of heavy drinkers, by SIMD deprivation quintile (assuming expenditure remains unchanged)
Drinker group (n) SIMD
deprivation
quintile
% of quintile
(n)
All (n = 639) 1 (most deprived) 47.1% (301)
2 19.9% (127)
3 15.5% (100)
4 9.1% (58)
5 (least deprived) 8.3% (53)
Descriptors of recorded consumption
Average index week
consumption (UK units)
Average Price Paid
(ppu)
Expenditure (£) Average Price
Trend across
quintile (P value)
Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD)
Group A: drinkers purchasing exclusively from
on-sale settings (n = 19)
1 2.3% (7) 93.9 (60.2) 25.7–178.9 117 (20.4) 94–154 104.06 (60.35) Low numbers
2 4.7% (6) 115.1 (87.4) 10.2–226.7 120 (13.2) 100–133 146.52 (117.15)
3 5% (5) 155.2 (170.6) 57.6–457.5 103 (22.7) 71–128 158.68 (181.00)
4 1.7% (1) 89.4 98 87.50
5
Group B: drinkers purchasing exclusively from
off-sale settings but each paying a mean price
of 50 ppu or more (n = 84)
1 14.0% (42) 155.6 (95.3) 19.7–393.8 55 (5) 50–69 84.24 (50.05) 0.015
2 7.9% (10) 118.4 (78.6) 18.8–285.5 57 (10) 50–82 66.08 (43.00)
3 11% (11) 182.4 (121.5) 50.4–413.4 60 (9) 50–79 110.26 (83.73)
4 15.5% (9) 117.5 (91.4) 35.0–315.0 56 (6) 50–65 64.29 (46.88)
5 22.6% (12) 91.8 (48.0) 28.1–175.7 60 (8) 50–74 52.70 (24.86)
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Predicted impact of MUP assuming all off-sales purchases are
priced at 50 ppu
Group C: drinkers purchasing exclusively from
off-sale settings but each paying a mean price
of less than 50 ppu (n = 438)
Mean (SD)
maximum UK
units which
could be
purchased post
MUP
(Expenditure/£0.5)
Mean (SD) percentage change in
consumption post MUP
Decrease Increase
1 72.4% (218) 249.7 (141.1) 24.9–813.4 33 (10)a 11–49 80.31 (52.04) n.s. 160.6 (104.1) −34.8 (20.6)
2 74.0% (94) 200.4 (115.9) 31.5–656.3 33 (11) 13–49 64.77 (41.59) 129.5 (83.2) −33.5 (21.1)
3 61.0% (61) 272.3 (207.8) 18.8–1203.0 34 (11) 11–49 84.88 (59.03) 169.8 (118.1) −32.4 (22.5)
4 58.6% (34) 213.8 (141.5) 21.2–705.2 34 (11) 17–49 66.03 (39.21) 132.1 (78.4) −32.9 (21.5)
5 58.5% (31) 181.3 (88.9) 9.8–420.0 36 (7) 16–45 62.94 (31.60) 125.9 (63.2) −28.0 (14.2)
Group D: drinkers purchasing from both off- and
on-sales settings (n = 98)
Potential response 1: drinkers
will continue to purchase at
previous levels in on-sale
settings and only off-sale
purchasing will be subject
to MUP at 50 ppua
1 11.3% (34) 213.5 (102.9) 27.2–422.3 63 (19) 21–100 133.90 (86.93) n.s. 185.6 (96.5) −19.0 (15.6) n = 26 +13.2 (10.4) n = 7
2 13.4% (17) 224.8 (165.2) 44.0–717.5 72 (33) 29–145 136.52 (88.44) 207.3 (151.3) −23.5 (17.9) n = 8 +27.3 (43.2) n = 9
3 23.0% (23) 206.4 (91.0) 29.5–405.3 65 (22) 29–104 131.30 (82.79) 193.6 (102.8) −16.5 (14.2) n = 17 +38.6 (30.5) n = 5
4 24.1% (14) 142.5 (84.1) 28.0–310.3 64 (28) 39–125 80.83 (43.54) 125.4 (67.0) −16.6 (11.9) n = 10 +42.7 (66.9) n = 3
5 18.9% (10) 113.0 (52.5) 43.5–188.2 80 (26) 34–113 82.28 (32.63) 116.8 (48.2) −17.8(13.0) n = 3 +19.8 (14.1) n = 7
Potential response 2: drinkers
will purchase only in Off-
sale settings post MUP at
50 ppub
1 As above 267.8 (173.9) −24.0 (21.8) n = 8 +42.8 (27.9) n = 25
2 273.0 (176.9) −30.4 (10.9) n = 3 +59.0 (62.1) n = 14
3 262.6 (165.6) −21.3 (14.1) n = 5 +43.2 (38.0) n = 18
4 161.7 (87.1) −17.0 (5.4) n = 4 +44.9 (57.1) n = 10
5 164.6 (65.3) −22.8 n = 1 +77.7 (35.8) n = 8
aFor n = 3 drinkers there was no change in consumption.
bFor n = 2 drinkers there was no change in consumption.
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change impacting on alcohol selling price. The consumption of the
majority (72–78%) of our sample of ill, heavy drinkers, according
to the assumptions we have made, is predicted to be reduced if a
MUP of 50 ppu was implemented. However, it is important to stress
that even amongst these very heavy consumers there are individuals
whose purchasing, with MUP set at 50 ppu, may not be affected
(despite possibly buying some individual drinks below 50 ppu). We
have identiﬁed three groups who fall into this category (accounting
for around 22–28% of our sample). Theoretically, these drinkers
may be able ﬁnancially to resist any reduction in their alcohol pur-
chasing following MUP instigation. They comprise: drinkers pur-
chasing exclusively from off-sale outlets but paying on average in
excess of 50 ppu, secondly those consuming alcohol entirely within
on-sale outlets, and ﬁnally, around one third of those purchasing at
both on and off-sale outlets. The ﬁnal group of drinkers, we suggest,
have the option of maintaining their consumption levels at no add-
itional cost by ‘trading differently’ rather than trading down; trans-
ferring their purchasing from on-sales to off-sales. Thus, around one
quarter of our drinkers may be immune to the impact of MUP but,
nevertheless, all are drinkers who had been sufﬁciently harmed by
their alcohol intake to necessitate attendance at an NHS setting.
Certainly those who have advocated the introduction of a MUP
accept that it is only one of many strategies required to reduce
harms caused by alcohol (Alcohol Health Alliance, 2016). Our ﬁnd-
ings endorse this view. There may also be a case for introducing a
higher level of MUP than 50 ppu.
Of those potentially vulnerable to MUP, i.e. purchasing exclu-
sively within off-sale settings below MUP, several strategies could,
theoretically, buffer the impact of MUP: some might be more able to
source additional funds by whatever means to sustain consumption,
or access other sources of alcohol, e.g. internet purchasing, cross
border purchasing, illicit/illegal/substitute alcohol or turn to psycho-
active drugs.
Clearly, trading down to cheaper options to maintain consump-
tion would not, after MUP, be an option (Black et al., 2014). Some
participants referred to illicit alcohol, but expressed unease around
its health risks. Whether or not this view is maintained post MUP
merits investigation. Stealing alcohol or drinking non-beverage alco-
hol were infrequently reported by 115 dependent drinker participants
in Falkner et al.’s (2015) study from New Zealand while Stockwell
et al.’s (2012b) qualitative study from Canada involving 15 depend-
ent homeless drinkers documented 2 drinkers who would resort to
stealing alcohol and 2 who would use non-alcohol beverages when
faced with a shortage of funds. We cannot speculate on the ability of
our drinkers to increase spending to maintain consumption, for apart
from SIMD we have no separate measure of income. Indeed in our
sample of drinkers only four individuals (less than 1%) reported
stealing alcohol. Certainly, some participants’ only income was social
security beneﬁts. Close relatives and friends were reported by some
as alternative sources of funds while others, conversely, had their
funds controlled by relatives (O’May et al., 2016).
Holmes et al. (2014) suggest that harmful drinkers on low
incomes purchase most alcohol at less than MUP, consequently they
would be most affected by MUP. However, for the group (C) cur-
rently paying less than 50 ppu, we were not able to show, in the
types of very heavy drinkers we sampled and in the limited number
of patients, a different effect between multiple deprivation quintiles.
(We did not attempt to collect data on our participants’ incomes.)
Angus et al. (2016), using data from the Scottish Health Survey
which recruits adult householders, employed modelling software to
estimate the impact of a 50 ppu price on the consumption of
harmful drinkers and computed an annual reduction of 246.2 units
(i.e. 4.7 units per week), with those in poverty reducing by 680.9
units (13.1/week), those not in poverty 180.9 units (3.5/week).
These ﬁgures are lower than ours, because our drinkers were typic-
ally drinking extremely heavily. Angus et al. (2016) estimated that
heavy drinkers in poverty would spend £88.00 less on alcohol per
annum, while those not in poverty would spend £20.00 more in the
same period. Our calculations have not considered the possibility
that heavy drinkers would reduce expenditure on alcohol post MUP
(and thus markedly reduce consumption). On the other hand, the type
of drinker who might want to maintain the level of consumption des-
pite MUP is the addictive drinker. O’May et al. (2016) in this sample
documented accounts of purchasing alcohol speciﬁcally to self-
medicate to avert withdrawal seizures, i.e. the drivers impacting on
sourcing alcohol may not only be economic.
We have already noted that a key strength of this study is the
provision of data relating to drinkers who are unlikely to be
adequately represented in general population health surveys; thus,
the drinkers most acutely affected by MUP may be poorly repre-
sented in modelling studies. Certainly our data provide some inter-
esting contrasts in this regard. Angus et al. (2016) suggest that
harmful drinkers (their heaviest drinking group) drank 80% of their
alcohol from off-sales (our group 95%), paid a mean price of
around 67 ppu (our group mean = 43.8 ppu) and sourced around
44–62% of purchases below 50 ppu (our group 80%). They report
an annual consumption of 3498 units (i.e. 67.3 per week) with
weekly intake rising to 86.5 units for those in poverty. In our group
the mean intake in the recorded week was 215.5 units. Baseline
expenditure of around £45.38 per week contrasts with that of our
participants’ £84.40. Other differences are noted in regard to cider
consumption: the mean price paid per unit was around 42 ppu (our
group 23.4 ppu) with ciders accounting for around 6% of all intake
(34.4% in our group), wine 33% (6.7% in our group) and spirits
around 27% (32.7% in our group). The possibility that the impact
of MUP on the consumption of heavy drinkers may be greater than
that proposed by Angus et al. (2016) merits further study. Gender
differences in relation to drink preferences and purchase place may
also be relevant in predicting responses to policy changes and
deserve attention as reported by Meier et al. (2009) from analysis
involving data from the annual Expenditure and Food Survey and
the General Household Survey. Our ﬁndings reported previously are
consistent with this view (Gill et al., 2015b); female harmful drin-
kers purchased almost exclusively from off-sale outlets (99%: Meier
et al. 88%) but differ in favouring spirits and white cider for over
60% of purchases whereas in the Meier et al. (2009) analysis a simi-
lar preference was evident for wine.
The generalizability of our ﬁndings can be questioned. We have
not interviewed the ill heavy drinkers who are not seen by services,
or those at an earlier stage in their drinking career who do not yet
require medical services. In relation to accuracy of recall and honesty
of reporting, the interview took as long as required and time was
allowed to explore ambiguities in recall with a very low rate of miss-
ing data, which is one of the strengths of this study. The index week
consumption ﬁgures which we report are consistent with those
recorded from similar types of drinker in our pilot study (Black et al.,
2011) and in an English setting (Sheron et al., 2014) and New
Zealand (Falkner et al., 2015). We are not implying that a drinker’s
yearly alcohol expenditure can be calculated from our data, i.e. that
this drinking pattern occurred every week. Certainly, some partici-
pants provided detail of a regular, consistent, weekly pattern of con-
sumption. For others the recorded index week may have been
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followed by periods of clinic attendance, hospitalization, treatment,
money shortage, etc.
We accept that our assumption of an elasticity of −1.0 is open to
debate, a more nuanced approach is, however, unsupported by
existing evidence relating to the heaviest drinkers, typically excluded
from population health surveys, as described here. (For discussion
of alcohol elasticities see Meng et al., 2014, Osterberg, 2012).
Furthermore, we did not record income and we cannot reliably pre-
dict how participants will ﬁnance more expensive alcohol following
the instigation of MUP should they wish to maintain their consump-
tion level. Our previous work (O’May et al., 2016) documented
accounts from drinkers who advised that alcohol was purchased
after necessities had been ﬁnanced while, for others, drink took pre-
cedence over other outgoings. We have already mentioned how
alcohol dependence might inﬂuence a more reasoned decision
around purchasing.
In conclusion, we suggest that MUP will impact on the majority
of the drinkers in our sample, but to differing extents. For some, it
may simply mean a change of purchasing venue. But for those cur-
rently purchasing below MUP, we have shown, crucially, that this
group contains over 50% of the drinkers from each of the ﬁve mul-
tiple deprivation quintiles. They sourced off-sale alcohol at between,
on average, 33 and 36 pence per unit and theoretically would face,
around a one third fall in consumption. How this fall in consump-
tion impacts on clinical symptoms is unknown; however, because
those most deprived suffer higher rates of social and medical harms
(Bellis et al., 2016) those groups may well be seen to gain more, in
terms of reducing harms, than other groups.
FUNDING
This study was supported jointly by the Chief Scientist Ofﬁce,
Scotland (CZH/4/645) and Alcohol Research UK (R2011/01).
Supplementary funding was provided by NHS Health Scotland and
NHS Lothian Foundation Trust and in kind by the Scottish Mental
Health Research Network.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATEMENT
None declared.
REFERENCES
Alcohol Health Alliance (2016) Written Response on the 2003 Licensing Act
to the House of Lords. http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/
committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/licensing-act-2003-committee/
licensing-act-2003/written/36695.html (22 June 2017, date last accessed).
Angus C, Holmes J, Pryce R, et al. (2016) Model-based appraisal of the com-
parative impact of Minimum Unit Pricing and taxation policies in
Scotland. An adaptation of the Shefﬁeld Alcohol Policy Model version 3.
Shefﬁeld: ScHARR, University of Shefﬁeld. https://www.shef.ac.uk/
polopoly_fs/1.565373!/ﬁle/Scotland_report_2016.pdf (22 June 2017, date
last accessed).
Beeston C, McAdams R, Craig N, et al. (2016) Monitoring and Evaluating
Scotland’s Alcohol Strategy. Final Report. Edinburgh: NHS Health Scotland.
Bellis MA, Hughes K, Nicholls J, et al. (2016) The alcohol harm paradox:
using a national survey to explore how alcohol may disproportionately
impact health in deprived individuals. BMC Public Health 16:111. 10.
1186/s12889-016-2766-x.
Black H, Gill J, Chick J. (2011) The price of a drink: levels of consumption
and price paid per unit of alcohol by Edinburgh’s ill drinkers with a com-
parison to wider alcohol sales in Scotland. Addiction 106:729–36.
Black H, Michalova L, Gill J, et al. (2014) White cider consumption and hea-
vy drinkers: a low-cost option but an unknown price. Alcohol Alcohol
49:675–80.
Brennan A, Meng Y, Holmes J, et al. (2014) Potential beneﬁts of minimum
unit pricing for alcohol versus a ban on below cost selling in England
2014: modelling study. Br Med J 349:g5452. 10.1136/bmj.g5452./.
Cousins M, Mongan D, Barry J, et al. (2016) Potential impact of minimum
unit pricing for alcohol in Ireland: evidence from national alcohol diary
survey. Alcohol Alcohol 51:734–40.
Falkner C, Christie G, Lifeng Z, et al. (2015) The effect of alcohol price on
dependent drinkers’ alcohol consumption. N Z Med J 128:9–17.
Gill J, Chick J, Black H, et al. (2015a) Alcohol purchasing by ill heavy drin-
kers; cheap alcohol is no single commodity. Public Health 129:1571–8.
Gill J, Chick J, Black H, et al. (2015b) The enigma of ‘harmful’ alcohol con-
sumption; evidence from a mixed methods study involving female drin-
kers in Scotland. Perspect Public Health 136:34–42.
Holmes J, Meng Y, Meier PS, et al. (2014) Effects of minimum unit pricing
for alcohol on different income and socioeconomic groups: a modelling
study. Lancet 383:1655–64.
Johnston MC, Ludbrook A, Jaffray A. (2012) Inequalities in the distribution
of the costs of alcohol misuse in Scotland: a cost of illness study. Alcohol
Alcohol 7:725–31.
Ludbrook A, Petrie D, McKenzie L, et al. (2012) Tackling alcohol misuse:
purchasing patterns affected by minimum pricing for alcohol. Appl
Health Econ Health Policy 10:51–63.
Meier P, Purshouse R, Brennan A. (2009) Policy options for alcohol price
regulation: the importance of modelling population heterogeneity.
Addiction 105:383–93.
Meier PS, Holmes J, Angus C, et al. (2016) Estimated effects of different alco-
hol taxation and price policies on health inequalities: a mathematical
modelling study. PLoS Med 10.1371/journal.pmed.1001963.
Meng Y, Hill-McManus D, Brennan A, et al. (2012) Model based appraisal
of alcohol minimum pricing and off-licensed trade discount bans in
Scotland: a Scottish adaptation of the Shefﬁeld Alcohol Policy Model
(v2): Second update based on newly available data. Shefﬁeld: University
of Shefﬁeld, ScHARR. http://www.shefﬁeld.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.156503!/
ﬁle/scotlandjan.pdf (22 June 2017, date last accessed).
Meng Y, Brennan A, Purshouse R, et al. (2014) Estimation of own and cross
price elasticities of alcohol demand in the UK: a pseudo-panel approach
using the Living Costs and Food Survey 2001–2009. J Health Econ 34:
96–103.
National Records for Scotland (2015) Alcohol related deaths website. https://
www.nrscotland.gov.uk/statistics-and-data/statistics/statistics-by-theme/
vital-events/deaths/alcohol-related-deaths/main-points (22 June 2017,
date last accessed).
O’May F, Gill J, Black H, et al. (2016) Heavy drinkers’ perspectives on min-
imum unit pricing for alcohol in Scotland: a qualitative interview study.
SAGE Open Jul-Sep:1–10. 10.1177/2158244016657141.
Osterberg E. (2012) Pricing of alcohol. WHO/Europe. http://www.euro.who.
int/__data/assets/pdf_ﬁle/0004/191371/11-Pricing-of-alcohol.pdf (19 June
2017, date last accessed).
Purshouse RC, Brennan A, Taylor KB, et al. (2010) Estimated effect of alco-
hol pricing policies on health and health economic outcomes in England:
an epidemiological model. Lancet 375:1355–64.
Scottish Government. (2012a) Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation 2012.
Edinburgh: National Statistics. http://simd.scotland.gov.uk/publication-
2012/ (22 June 2017, date last accessed).
Scottish Government. (2012b) The Scottish Government SIMD Postcode
Lookup. http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Statistics/SIMD/SIMDPostco
deLookup (22 June 2017, date last accessed).
Scottish Government (2014) The Scottish Health Survey 2013: Volume 1:
Main Report. Edinburgh: Scottish Government. http://www.gov.scot/
Publications/2014/12/9982 (19 June 2017, date last accessed).
7Alcohol and Alcoholism
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/alcalc/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/alcalc/agx060/4107214/Heavy-Drinkers-and-the-Potential-Impact-of-Minimum
by Queen Margaret University user
on 14 September 2017
Scottish Government (2016) Minimum Unit Pricing. http://www.gov.scot/
Topics/Health/Services/Alcohol/minimum-pricing (22 June 2017, date last
accessed).
Scottish Parliament. (2012) Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act 2012.
Edinburgh: Scottish Parliament. Available at: http://www.legislation.gov.
uk/asp/2012/4/pdfs/asp_20120004_en.pdf (22 July 2017, date last
accessed).
Sheron N, Chilcott F, Matthews L, et al. (2014) Impact of minimum price per
unit of alcohol on patients with liver disease in the UK. Clin Med 14:
396–403.
Sobell LC, Sobell MB. (1996) Timeline Followback: User’s Guide. Toronto:
Addiction Research Foundation.
Stockwell T, Zhao J, Giesbrecht N, et al. (2012a) The raising of minimum
alcohol prices in Saskatchewan, Canada: impacts on consumption and
implications for public health. Am J Public Health 102:e103–10.
Stockwell T, Williams N, Pauly B. (2012b) Working and waiting: homeless drin-
kers’ responses to less affordable alcohol. Drug Alcohol Rev 31:823–4.
Stockwell T, Zhao J, Martin G, et al. (2013) Minimum alcohol prices and out-
let densities in British Columbia, Canada: estimated impacts on alcohol-
attributable hospital admissions. Am J Public Health 103:2014–20.
8 Alcohol and Alcoholism
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/alcalc/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/alcalc/agx060/4107214/Heavy-Drinkers-and-the-Potential-Impact-of-Minimum
by Queen Margaret University user
on 14 September 2017
